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Abstract—Machine learning models are vulnerable to very
small adversarial input perturbations. Here, we study the ques-
tion of whether the list of predictions made by a list of models
can also be changed arbitrarily by a single small perturbation.
Clearly, this is a harder problem since one has to simultaneously
mislead several models using the same perturbation, where
the target classes assigned to the models might differ. This
attack has several applications over models designed by different
manufacturers for a similar purpose. One might want a single
perturbation that acts differently on each model; like only mis-
leading a subset, or making each model predict a different label.
Also, one might want a perturbation that misleads each model
the same way and thereby create a transferable perturbation.
Current approaches are not applicable for this general problem
directly. Here, we propose an algorithm that is able to find a
perturbation that satisfies several kinds of attack patterns. For
example, all the models could have the same target class, or
different random target classes, or target classes designed to be
maximally contradicting. We evaluated our algorithm using three
model sets consisting of publicly available pre-trained ImageNet
models of varying capacity and architecture. We demonstrate
that, in all the scenarios, our method is able to find visually
insignificant perturbations that achieve our target adversarial
patterns. 1
Index Terms—adversarial examples, multi-model attack, model
set attack, DeepFool, deep neural networks
I. INTRODUCTION
Several studies have demonstrated that current deep learning
models are highly sensitive to small adversarial input perturba-
tions [1], [2]. The original formulation of the problem assumes
that we are given a model and a correctly classified example.
The attacker wishes to find a minimal input perturbation that
results in the prediction of any wrong label (untargeted attack)
or a given desired label (targeted attack). In the past few
years, a large number of methods have been proposed to create
better adversarial examples [3], [4] and to provide defense
mechanisms [5], [6]. Yuan et al. provide a recent overview [7].
We study a more general version of this problem, where
we are given a set of models trained on the same multi-class
classification problem, as well as an input example. We assume
that our set contains independently trained standalone models.
That is, our focus is not on model ensembles. We could
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Fig. 1. Left: original image (prediction: ’Gila monster’); Middle: multi-
model perturbation; Right: adversarial image (predictions: MobileNetV2:
’bison’, MobileNet: ’balloon’, NASNetMobile: ’pole’, DenseNet121: ’acorn’,
DenseNet169: ’washbasin, handbasin, washbowl, lavabo, wash-hand basin’,
DenseNet201: ’custard apple’).
envisage the models to be products of different manufacturers.
Nevertheless, our results are applicable to any set of models.
We assume that the models are completely known; in other
words, we are concerned with the white box scenario.
Our formulation allows for a wide variety of attacks on a
given model set. The attacker may want every model to make
the same mistake or (if, for example, hired by one of the
manufacturers) to make different mistakes. The scenario where
all of the models are made to predict the same wrong label
is also related to the problem of finding adversarial examples
for ensembles of models in the hope that these examples will
also fool other unseen black box models [6], [8], [9]. In our
version, however, every single model will make the given
wrong prediction; not only the ensemble as a whole, where
it might be enough to mislead, for example, the majority of
the models (depending on the ensemble decision method).
An attacker may also be a nihilist who wants to achieve
chaotic behavior. One way of doing this would be to make
every model predict different random labels for the same input.
One might think that a single perturbation that satisfies such
harsh conditions should be extremely hard to find or might
not even exist. Figure 1 shows such a perturbation, found
by our algorithm. In a recent work, Song et al. investigated
random target labels [10] in a multi-label classification setting.
However, our setting is more challenging because we have a
set of models trained on the same multi-class classification
task. For this reason, the intersection of arbitrary classes is
expected to be smaller than in a multi-label problem.
We propose a heuristic iterative algorithm to solve our
multi-model adversarial problem. The algorithm is inspired by
the DeepFool method [3] in that we also guide our search with
the help of linear approximations of decision boundaries. We
evaluated our method over the ImageNet dataset [11] using
three sets of pre-trained models. We selected model sets so
that we could evaluate different aspects of model diversity
such as architecture and capacity. Model capacity is interesting
to consider, since it has been shown that capacity alone could
increase the robustness of individual models [5]. The diversity
of the model architectures within the set is another important
factor. For example, in [9], Pang et al. used the ensemble of
diverse models to train a robust ensemble classifier. We expect
that the diversity and the capacity of the models play a key role
in robustness, and a set that is diverse along both dimensions
is harder to attack.
We demonstrate that our algorithm can find feasible adver-
sarial perturbations that fool all the models according to the
given pattern in all the scenarios we examined. The adver-
sarial target patterns include predicting the same wrong label,
predicting different randomly selected labels, and predicting a
set of labels that are designed to be maximally inconsistent.
We found that model sets that include models with different
architectures have a somewhat higher robustness than sets with
similar architectures but with different capacity. However, in
each case, the perturbations we found are imperceptible to the
human eye.
In a recent paper [12], we made preliminary steps towards
tackling the multi-model problem. Our original contributions
here are the following:
1) Formalizing the targeted multi-model adversarial pertur-
bation problem.
2) Proposing and evaluating several novel algorithm vari-
ants for solving the multi-model adversarial perturbation
problem. These include the application of the pseudo-
inverse of the constraint matrix, the application of the
aggregated gradient instead of the maximal distance
direction, the introduction of a step size limit to reduce
the perturbation size, and the introduction of a candidate
class list to manage problems with many classes.
3) Evaluating the algorithm over ImageNet using pre-
trained publicly available deep networks.
4) Evaluating several adversarial patterns including the
random label assignment and two variants of ‘hard’
label assignments where the idea is to assign different
target labels to different models so that the required
perturbation is maximally inconsistent.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section II we
describe our algorithms in detail. In Section III we present
several designs for creating adversarial target pattern. In Sec-
tion IV we present our experimental evaluation. Section V
concludes the paper.
II. ATTACKING MODEL SETS
Let us first introduce our notations. As mentioned in the
Introduction, the problem is defined over a set of models and
an example to perturb. The example is given in the form (x, y),
where x ∈ Rd is the feature vector, and y ∈ C is its true label.
The set C contains the class labels and Cadv = C \ {y} is the
set of possible adversarial target labels for x.
The set of multi-class models is given as F = {f1, . . . , fm},
where fi : R
d → R|C|. That is, the models have one
output for every possible class label. We assume that all the
models are trained over the same multi-class problem. The
classification of a given input x by a model fi is given by
ki(x) = argmaxj fi,j(x), where fi,j(x) is the jth element of
the vector fi(x).
Although not strictly required by the framework, we note
that in our implementation we used the unnormalized output
(that is, the output without the softmax normalization) as our
models fi. When it is possible, this makes sense, because
the normalization simply makes the gradients flatter without
changing the ranking of the labels.
The predicted labels of the models are given by K(x) =
(k1(x), . . . , km(x)) ∈ Cm. In this study, we define the set
Cmadv as the set of all the possible adversarial patterns for
the model set F . Note that this way, we require here that
all the models are assigned an adversarial label. This is not a
severe restriction, one could also allow or even require some
models to retain their true labels. An attacker will probably
have further specific restrictions on the desired target patterns,
so the set of desired adversarial patterns are given as a subset
of all the patterns as P ⊆ Cmadv. Formally, we are looking for
a perturbation r∗ that has minimal L2 norm and makes the
classifiers predict one of the desired patterns:
r∗ = argmin
r
‖r‖2, subject to K(x+ r) ∈ P . (1)
The constraint of this optimization problem in (1) can be
unrolled as a system of equations for a given pattern p ∈ P
as
k1(x+ r) = p1
...
km(x+ r) = pm.
(2)
We can transform this system of equations into a system of
inequalities using the fact that the equations require that the
adversarial label correspond to the maximal element in the
model’s output. Accordingly, for the ith equation ki(x+ r) =
pi, let k̂i(x) = argmaxj 6=pi fi,j(x) be the label that is the
most likely label among the labels other than pi. This gives
us the equivalent system of inequalities
f1,k̂1(x+r)(x + r) ≤ f1,p1(x+ r)
...
fm,k̂m(x+r)(x+ r) ≤ fm,pm(x+ r),
(3)
where the equality holds when a point x + r is exactly on
the decision boundary between classes pi and k̂i(x+ r). This
can be considered as a generalization of the formalization of
the DeepFool [3] algorithm where, instead of a system of
inequalities, we have just a single inequality. In other words,
in the model set there is only one model.
Due to the nonlinearities of the functions fi,j(x + r),
this problem cannot be solved directly. As in the DeepFool
algorithm, we substitute these functions with their first order
approximations around x, that is, fi,j(x + r) ≈ fi,j(x) +
Algorithm 1 Multi-model adversarial perturbation
1: Input: example x, models F , adversarial patterns P
2: x0 ← x
3: i← 0
4: while i < imax and K(xi) /∈ P do
5: for pk ∈ P do
6: rk ← approximateQP(xi, pk)
7: end for
8: r ← rargmink ‖rk‖2 ⊲ rk with the smallest norm
9: r ← min(η/‖r‖2, 1) · r ⊲ enforce ‖r‖2 ≤ η
10: xi+1 ← xi + r
11: i← i + 1
12: end while
13: return xi ⊲ the perturbed input
∇fi,j(x)T · r, which results in the following system of in-
equalities:
∇(f1,k̂1(x)(x) − f1,p1(x))
T · r ≤ f1,p1(x) − f1,k̂1(x)(x)
...
∇(fm,k̂m(x)(x) − fm,pm(x))
T · r ≤ fm,pm(x) − fm,k̂m(x)(x),
(4)
which is a set of linear constraints. The objective of the
optimization problem is quadratic, which means that we have
a quadratic programming (QP) problem.
A naive view would be to solve this problem with an
efficient QP solver, and—since the linear constraints only
approximate the actual constraints—iterate this procedure until
the original set of constraints is satisfied. Using a QP solver,
however, introduces certain problems. First, although efficient
solvers are known, we might need to run them many times,
which might become inefficient. Second, if there is no feasible
solution for the linear approximation, the original problem
might still have one, so we should create new approximations
for each iteration. For these reasons, instead we used three
heuristics to approximate the solution of the QP problem. We
discuss these later on in more detail.
We are now ready to present the pseudocode of the algo-
rithm, represented as Algorithm 1. We assume that we are
given an example x. The models in F have to predict one of
the patterns in P . Recall that if there are more than one pattern
in P , satisfying any of these patterns is considered a success.
The outer loop runs until this goal is met (or we reach the
maximal number of iterations).
The inner loop iterates through the patterns, and calculates
the heuristic solution of the QP that is defined by the particular
pattern. After calculating these approximate solutions rk, the
one with the smallest norm is selected. If the magnitude
of this perturbation is larger than the allowed maximum
step size η, then the perturbation is normalized. This step
offers some protection to the algorithm in cases where the
linear approximation has a large error. This perturbation size
restriction technique is partly related to trust region methods.
Here, we use a fixed η parameter that controls the size of
the trusted region in a static manner. Changing η dynamically
could offer further improvements [13].
A. Heuristics to Solve the Inner QP Problem
Let us now describe three implementations of the method
APPROXIMATEQP that is used in the inner loop of Algo-
rithm 1. Let us first normalize the inequalities in (4) by divid-
ing both sides by ‖∇(fi,k̂i(x)(x)−fi,pi(x))‖2. Let us introduce
a new notation to represent the normalized inequalities. On the
left hand side, let
wi =
∇(fi,k̂i(x)(x)− fi,pi(x))
‖∇(fi,k̂i(x)(x) − fi,pi(x))‖2
(5)
and on the right hand side, let
f ′i,pi =
fi,pi(x)− fi,k̂i(x)(x)
‖∇(fi,k̂i(x)(x) − fi,pi(x))‖2
. (6)
With these notations, equation i becomes wTi · r ≤ f ′i,pi .
Note that the value f ′i,pi represents the gap between the
class that is currently predicted by model fi and the desired
adversarial target class pi. Thus, we know that at the beginning
of the attack f ′i,pi ≤ 0 and the equality holds exactly when the
predicted class is already the target class. From now on, all
the heuristics below will ignore the models where the target
class is already predicted, and the algorithms will work only
with those equations that still have a negative right hand side.
1) MAX: Here, the idea is that we first identify the model
that has the largest gap between its target class and the current
class. We then approximate the minimal perturbation that
closes this gap, that is, that ’fixes’ this model. The idea is that
this way we first solve the hardest model and then gradually
adjust for the rest of the constraints. The approximation takes
the linear approximation of the model, for which the minimal
perturbation can be computed in closed form. The formulation
of this heuristic is
j = argmax1≤z≤m−f ′z,pz
rmax = −f ′j,pjwj .
(7)
Note that this computation is very similar to that of DeepFool,
since here we have a single model to consider (the one with
the maximal gap), and on that model we essentially run a
DeepFool step.
2) AVG: Here, we compute a direction that takes into
account all the models, instead of just choosing the one with
the maximal gap. Recall, that the vector wi represents the
direction of the minimal perturbation required to ’fix’ model
i, and ‖wi‖2 = 1 due to the normalization. We first compute
the average of these directions, weighted by the gap values.
We then return a perturbation vector that points in this average
direction. The length of the returned vector is computed to be
the maximum of the gap values. The reason is that this way we
are guaranteed not to overshoot, because this step size is the
minimal step size that potentially changes all the predictions.
If we use a smaller step size, there will be at least one model
that will not predict the target label. The formulation is
wavg =
∑m
z=1−f ′z,pzwz
j = argmax1≤z≤m−f ′z,pz
ravg = −f ′j,pj
wavg
‖wavg‖2
.
(8)
3) PINV: When we have only one model, the minimal
perturbation is computed as one step of the Newton method,
as done by DeepFool and by the MAX heuristic above as well.
We could also try to generalize this idea to multiple models by
taking the set of inequalities in (4) and demanding that equality
holds in each inequality. Since the number of variables will be
usually larger than the number of equalities, the system will be
underdetermined. We can then still solve this set of equalities
using the pseudo-inverse technique as applied in [10].
This heuristic will return a perturbation that points towards
the intersection of all the decision boundaries, which may
or may not be the smallest perturbation among those that
satisfy (4). In pathological cases, this intersection might be
extremely far from the optimal perturbation direction. In fact,
there might not even be such an intersection. Still, we include
this algorithm for comparison with [10]. Also this algorithm
could potentially be fast (ignoring pathological corner cases),
since in every iteration we try to solve every constraint.
Consider the matrix W = (w1, · · · , wm)T and vector F =
(−f ′1,p1 , · · · ,−f ′m,pm)T . The system of equations is then W ·
r = F , so the perturbation returned by the PINV algorithm is
given by
rpinv = W
+ · F, (9)
where W+ = (WTW )−1WT (assuming W has full rank) is
the pseudo-inverse of W . Note that it is known that rpinv will
be the minimum norm solution if there is a solution, and it
will represent an approximation with minimal error if there is
no solution [14].
B. Time complexity
The number of iterations of the algorithm depends on many
factors and hyperparameters. We evaluate this experimentally
later on. Here, we focus on the time complexity of a single
iteration. To perform one iteration, the linear approximation in
(4) needs to be calculated for every p ∈ P . For each pattern
p, we need to compute the prediction and the gradient of each
model, which means that we need to propagate one forward
pass and one backward pass through every network, if the
models are feedforward neural networks. Thus, the cost of
one iteration is 2 · m · |P| network propagations. If P has
only one element then the time complexity depends only on
m (the number of models). Note that these calculations can be
parallelized across the models as well as the patterns, and only
the forward pass needs to be performed before the backward
pass.
III. ADVERSARIAL TARGET PATTERNS
Our algorithm was formulated as a targeted attack, where
the acceptable adversarial patterns are given in the pattern set
P . This set might contain a single pattern, which is similar to
the classical targeted attack. Although it would be possible
to formulate a modified algorithm for the untargeted case,
one can achieve a similar effect by including several carefully
selected patterns in the target set.
In the following, we describe and motivate our four different
designs for the pattern set that we will use in our experimental
evaluation. We assume that we are given a fixed input x and the
patterns are designed as a function of this input. Our patterns
include three targeted patterns and an untargeted one.
Some of the designs are based on a ranking of class labels
C, based on the output of all the models for a given input
x. For a given input, each individual model defines a ranking
of the class labels based on the ordering of the values of the
corresponding output elements. The highest ranking class is
predicted by the model. The idea is that we wish to identify
those class labels that are ’similar’ to the true class label and
hence that are ranked high by most of the models. Further,
we are also interested in those labels that are treated as very
irrelevant by most of the models.
The ranking of the labels can be defined as a suitable
aggregation of the rankings of the individual models. Formally,
the ranking of a class label c ∈ C for a given example x and a
classifier fi is denoted by qi,x(c) ∈ {0, . . . , |C| − 1}. In other
words, qi,x(c) is the rank of label c in the ranking defined by
fi(x). For the predicted class label we have qi,x(ki(x)) = 0.
Note that any ranking aggregation could be used to determine
the common ranking. Here we used the Rank Product [15]
aggregation method, where the ranking of a label c is defined
by the ordering of the geometric mean rankings
RPx(c) =
m∏
j=1
qj,x(c)
1/m, ∀c ∈ C (10)
A. Random
Prandom contains only one element, that is, it defines a
targeted attack. This single pattern contains randomly gener-
ated adversarial class labels for all of the models. This attack
should be hard because the perturbed input should end up
in the intersection of the different unrelated classes of the
different models.
B. Reverse
Our goal here is to define a target pattern that is even harder
than the random pattern. Preverse will also contain only a
single pattern. To create this pattern, we used the ranking of the
class labels described above. From this ranking, we selected
the label that ranks the lowest, namely the label that is the
most irrelevant among the model set. We then demand that
the pattern contain this label for all the models.
C. Diverse
As another attempt to define a pattern that is maximally
hard, here Pdiverse has one pattern that contains labels that
rank low and, in addition, that are also inconsistent with each
other. We again use the low end of the ranking of the labels but
this time we consider the last 10 labels. Next, we compute the
adversarial direction for this ten labels for every model, using
a single linear approximation (DeepFool) step. We now have
10 directions for all the models. Out of this set, for every
model we select the direction such that the set of selected
directions over all the models form a maximally diverse set.
We measured the diversity of a given candidate pattern with the
help of the average cosine similarity of every pair of directions.
The pattern with the lowest value is selected. In our evaluation,
we performed an exhaustive search to find the most diverse
pattern.
TABLE I
NETWORKS USED IN THE EVALUATION
Model Parameters Depth Correctly Classified
MobileNetV2 [16] 3.5M 88 7153
MobileNet [17] 4.2M 88 7257
NASNetMobile [18] 5.3M - 7832
DenseNet121 [19] 8.1M 121 7729
DenseNet169 [19] 14.3M 169 8095
DenseNet201 [19] 20.2M 201 8331
D. Consistent
Here, we define an untargeted attack. This case is excep-
tional for two reasons. First, we include more than one pattern
in Pconsistent. Second, and most importantly, in this case the
pattern set will be dynamic; that is, we will update the set of
target patterns in every iteration using the method described
here. For clarity of presentation, this step is not included in
the pseudocode of Algorithm 1.
The patterns can just target the same adversarial label for
every model. In other words, all the models are required
to predict the same, adversarial label. We used the top 10
adversarial labels in each cycle. The ranking of the labels is
updated in each iteration using the Rank Product method and
the (already perturbed) input xi.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
We did experiments on models trained over the Ima-
geNet [11] dataset that contains RGB images with varying
sizes. The images are labeled with one of 1000 class labels.
In the preprocessing stage, a 224 × 224 image was cropped
from the middle of every original image.
Table I lists the pre-trained models we used along with
references. The table contains basic information about the
architecture of the networks. To evaluate our multi-model
algorithm, we created model sets using these individual
models. The mobile set includes the three mobile networks.
The members of the mobile set have a similar capacity,
that is, they have a similar number of parameters. However,
they have rather different network architectures. MobileNet
uses depthwise separable convolutions and MobileNetV2 uses
residual connections as well. NasNetMobile contains non-
human-designed blocks. The dense set contains the three
variants of DenseNet. These models have a similar architecture
but have a different capacity. Lastly, we also experimented
with the union of the mobile and dense sets that contain all
the six models. We will refer to this set as ‘All’.
During our experiments, we evaluated the individual models
as well as the three model sets. In our evaluation, we worked
with a set of 10,000 randomly selected images taken from the
training set for the individual models. The subset was the same
for every model. Out of this set of examples, we removed those
examples that were misclassified by the respective model.
Table I shows the number of examples that were classified
correctly. These examples form the evaluation set for the given
model. Due to their larger cost, the model sets were evaluated
on a smaller set, that contains 100 randomly selected examples
taken from the training set. Here, we also used the same
TABLE II
MODEL SETS
Model set Correctly Classified
Mobile 53
Dense 74
All 52
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Fig. 2. Perturbation size and number of iterations for the individual models
as a function of maximum step size (η). The models are shown in the order
of increasing capacity.
examples for every model set. Table II shows the number of
examples that were classified correctly by all the members of
the given set. These examples form the evaluation set for the
given model set.
Our main figure of merit is perturbation size. We define
perturbation size as the L2 norm of the adversarial perturbation
found, normalized by
√
d, where d = 224 × 224 × 3 is the
input dimension. We normalize by
√
d because in the case of
image data, this way we characterize the average perturbation
of each pixel irrespective of the resolution of the image, which
is a more natural measure. Recall, that each input feature has
a value in the range [0, 255].
The properties of the individual models can be seen in
Figure 2. Note that for individual models, our algorithm is
equivalent to DeepFool when η = ∞. All the attacks on all
the correctly classified examples were successful, irrespective
of the value of η. Clearly, the perturbation size increases with
model capacity. When setting a smaller η, we get a smaller
perturbation, but at the cost of more iterations. Interestingly,
the effect of η is much stronger on NASNetMobile than
on any other model. In this case, we can get a marked
improvement over the DeepFool algorithm. This is interesting,
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Fig. 3. Perturbation size and number of iterations for the mobile set as a
function of the maximum step size (η) and QP solver heuristic.
because DeepFool is often used to compute an upper bound
on the sensitivity of models, and in this case this upper bound
could be improved significantly. In general, setting a smaller
η improves the perturbation size in each case to some extent.
Next, we evaluated our multi-model algorithms on the
mobile set to test the effect of η, and the different QP solver
heuristics. The results are shown in Figure 3. We specified
imax = 10, 000. Like before, all the attacks were successful,
although the required number of iterations is significantly
larger than in the case of the individual models. A lower η
results in a smaller perturbation and an increased iteration
number.
The PINV and the AVG heuristics need fewer iterations,
as we expected. This is because these heuristics take into
account all the models in the model set in each iteration.
We can see that PINV results in the largest perturbation,
again, as expected, although the difference from the alternative
heuristics is surprisingly small.
For the other two model sets (dense and all), we performed
our experiments with a fixed η = 10 maximum step size
because, based on Figure 3, it offers a good compromise
between perturbation size and cost. The perturbation size and
the number of iterations over the three model sets and the four
attack patterns can be seen in Figure 4. The three heuristics are
shown separately. All the attempted attacks were successful.
The perturbation size of every model set for the four patterns
is larger than that for the individual models. Also, significantly
more iterations are required.
The consistent pattern leads to the smallest perturbation size
and the random and reverse patterns give a larger perturbation,
TABLE III
UNTARGETED INDIVIDUAL MODEL ATTACK WITH η = 10
Model Mean iterations
MobileNetV2 6.5
MobileNet 6.7
NASNetMobile 9
DenseNet121 8.3
DenseNet169 8.6
DenseNet201 9.2
TABLE IV
UNTARGETED MODEL SET ATTACK WITH η = 10
Model set MAX mean iter AVG mean iter PINV mean iter
Mobile set 25.9 16.9 14.9
Dense set 25.9 16.6 14.6
All 57.9 26.9 24.6
as expected. Surprisingly, the diverse pattern is not consistently
harder than the reverse pattern. In terms of the number of
iterations, there are significant differences among the attack
patterns. The attacks that are designed to be hard always
require orders of magnitude more iterations than the easiest
(untargeted) attack.
It is interesting that the mobile set requires a larger perturba-
tion than the dense set. We expected the opposite, because the
attack seemed to be harder if the models in the set are similar,
due to the requirement of unrelated classes having a non-empty
intersection. Combining all the six models further increases the
perturbation size, but it is still less than 1% on average for an
input feature. As we will see later, such a perturbation is still
imperceptible.
To better illustrate the difference between the number of
iterations required to compute the attack for individual models
and model sets, we present the average iteration number
for these two cases in tables III and IV. We illustrate the
untargeted case, that is, the attack pattern was Pconsistent for
the model set, and a simple untargeted DeepFool attack was
used for the individual attacks. From these tables, we see that
the required number of iterations appears to be proportional
to the number of models in the set.
To illustrate the perturbations that our algorithm creates,
we include an example for all the combinations of our three
model sets and four attack patterns in figures 5, 6, 7 and 8.
The examples we include are the ones that have the largest
perturbation among the example inputs. The applied heuristic
was MAX, and we set η = 10. In all the images, the top
row contains the original images, the middle row contains the
perturbation and the perturbed images are in the bottom row. In
the patterns, the order of the models is the same as in Table I.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Here, we introduced an iterative algorithm to find small
adversarial perturbations that fool multiple models simultane-
ously in a given pattern. This problem formulation has many
interesting applications, such as the generation of transferable
adversarial examples as well as generating a single pertur-
bation such that all the models in a given model set predict
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Fig. 4. Perturbation size and iterations for all the four attack patterns and the three QP solver heuristics (η = 10).
Fig. 5. The consistent attack pattern over the mobile set (abacus → dumbbell),
dense set (abacus → corn) and all the models (abacus → dumbbell).
specified, different classes. The latter scenario allows us to
explore the decision boundaries of the model set from a new
perspective.
The algorithm can be regarded as a generalization of the
DeepFool method to model sets. Also, we improved the
DeepFool algorithm itself by adding the step size parameter.
We evaluated our algorithm on three model sets using four
attack patterns over the ImageNet database. We found that the
algorithm produces small and successful perturbations reliably
in all the attack scenarios we examined. Perhaps the most
interesting result is that imperceptible adversarial perturbations
were found even when the labels were selected to make the
Fig. 6. The random attack pattern over the mobile set (crib → [llama,
thunder snake, Norwich terrier]), dense set (Australian terrier → [cornet,
lycaenid, malinois]), and all the models (abacus → [centipede, Pembroke,
Band Aid, bow-tie, EntleBucher, coyote, poncho]).
problem as hard as possible. This was surprising to us, even
in the light of the vast literature on adversarial attacks.
The perturbation sizes over the three model sets offered
some interesting insights as well. The set with different model
architectures (mobile set) needed somewhat larger perturba-
tions, but we expected just the opposite. Increasing the size of
the model set increased perturbation size as well. Nevertheless,
all the perturbations we found are imperceptible to the human
eye.
Fig. 7. The reverse attack pattern over the mobile set (greenhouse → pro-
jector), dense set (comic book → albatross) and all the models (comic book
→ mongoose).
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[6] F. Tramèr, A. Kurakin, N. Papernot, I. Goodfellow, D. Boneh, and
P. McDaniel, “Ensemble adversarial training: Attacks and defenses,” in
Proc. 6th International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR),
2018. [Online]. Available: https://openreview.net/forum?id=rkZvSe-RZ
[7] X. Yuan, P. He, Q. Zhu, and X. Li, “Adversarial examples: Attacks and
defenses for deep learning,” IEEE Trans. Neural Networks and Learning
Syst., vol. 30, no. 9, pp. 2805–2824, Sep. 2019.
[8] Y. Liu, X. Chen, C. Liu, and D. Song, “Delving into transferable
adversarial examples and black-box attacks,” in Proc. 5th International
Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR), 2017. [Online].
Available: https://openreview.net/forum?id=Sys6GJqxl
[9] T. Pang, K. Xu, C. Du, N. Chen, and J. Zhu, “Improving
adversarial robustness via promoting ensemble diversity,” in
Proceedings of the 36th International Conference on Machine
Learning, (ICML), 2019, pp. 4970–4979. [Online]. Available:
http://proceedings.mlr.press/v97/pang19a.html
[10] Q. Song, H. Jin, X. Huang, and X. Hu, “Multi-label adversarial perturba-
tions,” in 2018 IEEE International Conference on Data Mining (ICDM),
Nov 2018, pp. 1242–1247.
Fig. 8. The diverse attack pattern over the mobile set (abacus → [soft-coated-
wheaten terrier, soft-coated wheaten terrier, apron]), dense set (comic book
→ [sturgeon, black stork, capuchin]), and all the models (Australian terrier
→ [Saluki, borzoi, black stork, Saluki, gorilla, kuvasz]).
[11] O. Russakovsky, J. Deng, H. Su, J. Krause, S. Satheesh, S. Ma,
Z. Huang, A. Karpathy, A. Khosla, M. Bernstein, A. C. Berg, and
L. Fei-Fei, “ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge,”
International Journal of Computer Vision (IJCV), vol. 115, no. 3, pp.
211–252, 2015.
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